Question 1. Consider some Buddhist arguments against the reality of the personal self. Characterise and evaluate the arguments.
This is a straightforward question on the surface but also has some hidden subtlety. There are a range of arguments: (i) the argument form impermance; (ii) the argument from control—see Siderits, (iii) the argument there there is something permanent but it’s not worthy of designating self. And so on. See my Arguments for no-self notes. You will not be able to cover all these arguments in one essay. So, I recommend selecting some of them (that are related somehow, or which can be contrasted, etc.)
Use a few of these sources (I have attached a few) :
1. Siderits, Mark: Buddhism as Philosophy (chapter 3), but also, chapter 5.3 (the Nyaya objections to no-self.
2. Arindam Chakrabati, 1992. ‘I touch what I saw’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (on moodle week 1).
2. Carpenter, Amber, Indian Buddhist Philosophy (chapter 2)
3. Miri Albahari, Analytical Buddhism (various chapters). Ch.5: “How Do We Construe ‘The Self Lacks Reality’?”
4. Harding, Douglas, On Having No Head. Chapters 1 and 2.
5. MacKenzie, M. ‘Enacting the Self: Buddhist and Enactivist Approaches’. Self No Self collection.
6. Vallicella, W., ‘Can the Chariot take us to the Land of No-Self?’ (Readings1 moodle.)
7. Lectures (mainly 1 and 2) and Lecture notes. Impermanence argument and controll, in 1, the idea that there is something permanent but it’s no the self, is from 2. The idea that all things are empty of self and so there is no self, in 3-4.
Type of service: Academic paper writing
Type of assignment: Writing from scratch
Pages / words: 5 / 1400
Number of sources: 2
Academic level: Undergraduate
Paper format: APA
Line spacing: Double
Language style: US English